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INSTRUCTIONS APPLYNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 28, 1973

National Security Decision Memorandum 233

TO:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

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SUBJECT: Instructions for SALT, Geneva, September 24, 1973

JCS & DOS Review Complete

OSD Review Complete/DIF'ed by OSD 25X6

During the initial stages of this phase of negotiations the U.S. Delegation should seek to obtain USSR reaction to the U.S. proposals put forward in Geneva last May. The U.S. position set forth in NSDM 213 and 216 remains unchanged, and will be reviewed by the President only after receiving the USSR response.

In supporting the U.S. position, the Delegation should emphasize the following points:

1. The U.S. Delegation is guided by the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms. The position of the United States is fully consistent with these SALT principles.

2. The U.S. position is also based on the conviction that SALT must deal effectively, and in a verifiable manner, with the need to control developments which would provide first strike capabilities against major components of either side's deterrent forces. The ICBM programs now being pursued by the Soviet Union are of particular concern in this regard.

No action should be taken by the Delegation to foreshadow any changes in the U.S. position. If the USSR Delegation seeks further details of the U.S. position going beyond existing guidance (NSDMs 213, 216 and as appropriate 206 and 197), the Chairman of the Delegation should seek additional instructions. In the event of counterproposals by the USSR, the U.S. Delegation should seek their full exposition but refrain from expressing any U.S. views until receipt of instructions.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Central Intelligence

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May 3, 1973

National Security Decision Memorandum 213

TO: The Secretary of State
The Acting Secretary of Defense
The Acting Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT: Instructions for SALT Talks

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on May 4, 1973 in Geneva.

1. The overall U.S. objective continues to be a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms which provides a high degree of equivalency in central strategic systems -- ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.
2. The U.S. Delegation should emphasize again that such a permanent agreement must incorporate equal aggregate limits on the number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. The Delegation should take the position that the U.S. would be prepared to accept an equal level for both sides of 2,350. There would be appropriate provisions to permit the substitution of SLBMs and heavy bombers for ICBMs and for each other. In this context the United States would be prepared to consider:
 - a. qualitative limitations on strategic offensive ballistic missile forces;
 - b. prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of air-to-surface missiles with a maximum range greater than 3,000 kilometers;
 - c. measures to assure that the agreement would not be circumvented through deployment of non-central systems;

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General Declassification Schedule

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d. the Soviet proposal to ban the development, testing and deployment of:

- cruise missiles of intercontinental range;
- strategic ballistic missiles on water-borne vehicles other than submarines;
- strategic ballistic missiles on airborne platforms;
- fixed or mobile devices for launching ballistic missiles, which could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof, including the territorial sea and internal waters;

e. a program for achieving a reduced level of strategic forces.

3. At a meeting subsequent to outlining this position on a permanent agreement, the U.S. Delegation should state that the United States is prepared to move ahead promptly to conclude a provisional agreement freezing ICBM MIRVs to accompany the Interim Agreement. This provisional agreement would prohibit the development, testing, production, and deployment of new and modified MIRV/MRV systems for ICBMs. Deployment of other ICBM MIRV/MRV systems would be limited to those operational and under conversion as of July 1, 1973, and confidence testing of such ICBM MIRV/MRV systems would be permitted.

In presenting this proposal, the U.S. Delegation should emphasize the importance of controlling MIRVs on ICBMs promptly in order to preserve the survivability of deterrent forces, enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. The provisional agreement on MIRVs would remain in force until supplanted by a permanent agreement. In this connection the Delegation should make clear that the provisions of a permanent agreement regarding MIRV could be modified to reflect the degree of permanent equivalence achieved in the overall levels of strategic forces.

4. In elaborating on this proposal, the U.S. Delegation should present the following basic provisions and collateral constraints:

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-- The development, flight testing, production and deployment of new or modified ICBM MRV/MIRV systems (either dispensing mechanisms or RVs) is prohibited. New ICBM MRV/MIRV systems are defined as those ICBM MRV/MIRV systems which had not been flight tested as of January 1, 1973.

-- The deployment of other ICBM MIRV/MRV systems is limited to numbers operational or under construction/conversion as of July 1, 1973.

-- The flight testing of ICBM MRV/MIRVs is limited to confidence testing of the MRV/MIRV systems currently deployed and only in association with missiles with which they have been flight tested previously.


-- The development, flight testing, production and deployment of endoatmospheric penetration aids and new or modified dispensing mechanisms for exoatmospheric decoys is prohibited.

-- The development, flight testing, production and deployment of maneuvering re-entry vehicles for ICBMs is prohibited.

5. On the question of restraint, the U.S. should put forth the view that restraints should support specific agreements limiting strategic offensive arms, and should be aimed at developments which threaten the survivability of the deterrent forces of the other side. It is not possible to deal with the restraints question in specific terms until the terms of a possible concrete agreement become clear.

6. On the question of throw weight, the Delegation should take the position that in the context of adequate controls on MIRV a ceiling on further increases in ICBM throw weight would be acceptable. (Such a proposal would be pursued in the context of paragraph 2a above).

The President has asked me to emphasize once again the importance of avoiding leaks on this subject.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence

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